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Abstract—Social graphs derived from online social interac-
tions contain a wealth of information that is nowadays exten-
sively used by both industry and academia. However, as social
graphs contain sensitive information, they need to be properly
anonymized before release. Most of the existing graph anonymiza-
tion mechanisms rely on the perturbation of the original graph’s
edge set. In this paper, we identify a fundamental weakness of
these mechanisms: They neglect the strong structural proximity
between friends in social graphs, thus add implausible fake edges
for anonymization.
To exploit this weakness, we first propose a metric to quantify
an edge’s plausibility by relying on graph embedding. Extensive
experiments on three real-life social network datasets demonstrate
that our plausibility metric can very effectively differentiate fake
edges from original edges with AUC (area under the ROC curve)
values above 0.95 in most of the cases. We then rely on a Gaussian
mixture model to automatically derive the threshold on the edge
plausibility values to determine whether an edge is fake, which
enables us to recover to a large extent the original graph from
the anonymized graph. We further demonstrate that our graph
recovery attack jeopardizes the privacy guarantees provided by
the considered graph anonymization mechanisms.
To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose a method to
generate fake yet plausible edges given the graph structure and
incorporate it into the existing anonymization mechanisms. Our
evaluation demonstrates that the enhanced mechanisms decrease
the chances of graph recovery, reduce the success of graph de-
anonymization (up to 30%), and provide even better utility than
the existing anonymization mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of online social networks (OSNs)
has resulted in an unprecedented scale of social graph data
available. Access to such data is invaluable for both the indus-
trial and academic domains. For instance, Amazon or Netflix
have leveraged graph data to improve their recommendation
services. Moreover, researchers have been using graph data
to gain a deeper understanding of many fundamental societal
questions, such as people’s communication patterns [34], [50],
geographical movement [10], [51], and information propaga-
tion [23], [39]. These examples demonstrate that the sharing
of large-scale graph data can bring significant benefits to the
society.
On the downside, graph data also inherently contains very
sensitive information about individuals [7], such as their social
relations [4], and it can be used to infer private attributes [22].
In order to mitigate privacy risks, it is crucial to properly
anonymize the graph data before releasing it to third parties.
The naive approach of replacing real identifiers by random
numbers has been proven ineffective by Backstrom et al.
about a decade ago already [5]. From then on, the research
community has been working on developing more robust graph
anonymization mechanisms [26], [40], [31], [49], [20]. The
majority of the proposed mechanisms focus on perturbing
the original edge set of the graph (instead of perturbing the
node set) by adding fake edges between users, such that the
perturbed graph satisfies well-established privacy guarantees,
such as k-anonymity [44] and differential privacy [11].
A. Contributions
In this paper, we identify a fundamental weakness of
the most prominent graph anonymization mechanisms: When
creating fake edges, they do not take into account key char-
acteristics of the underlying graph structure, in particular, the
higher structural proximity between friends [25], which results
in fake edges not being plausible enough compared to the
original ones. To exploit this weakness, we first assess the
plausibility of each edge by relying on graph embedding [35],
[14]. We show that this approach can very effectively detect
fake edges (see Figure 1a for an example of the edge plau-
sibility distribution of fake and original edges on a real-life
social network dataset), and thus can eventually help recover
the original graph to a large extent. We then demonstrate
that our graph recovery attack jeopardizes the anonymization
mechanisms’ privacy guarantees. Finally, we develop enhanced
versions of the existing graph anonymization mechanisms that:
(i) create plausible edges (Figure 1b), (ii) reduce the risk of
graph recovery and graph de-anonymization, (iii) preserve the
initial privacy criteria provided by the mechanisms, and (iv)
provide even better graph utility (with respect to how well the
anonymized graph preserves the structural properties of the
original graph).
To illustrate the wide applicability of our approach, we
concentrate on two of the best established graph anonymization
mechanisms, namely k-DA [26] and SalaDP [40], which
provide k-anonymity and differential privacy guarantees, re-
spectively. The reason we choose k-DA and SalaDP is that
they are the best graph anonymization schemes with respect to
utility and resistance to de-anonymization (in addition to being
the most cited). This conclusion is drawn from the evaluation
performed by Ji et al. [18].
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(a) k-DA (k = 100)





















(b) Enhanced k-DA (k = 100)
Fig. 1: Plausibility distributions of fake and original edges in the NO dataset anonymized by (a) the original k-DA and (b) by
our enhanced k-DA mechanisms. The edge plausibility is defined in Section III. The NO dataset is collected by Viswanath et
al. [47], and k-DA [26] is one of the anonymization mechanisms we concentrate on in this paper.
In the following, we provide an overview of our contribu-
tions in this paper.
Edge Plausibility: We measure the plausibility of an edge as
the structural proximity between the two users it connects.
In the field of link prediction [25], structural proximity is
normally measured by human-designed metrics, which only
capture partial information of the proximity. Instead, we rely
on graph embedding [35], [14] to map users in the anonymized
graph into a continuous vector space, where each user’s vector
comprehensively reflects her structural properties in the graph.
Then, we define each edge’s plausibility as the similarity
between the vectors of the two users this edge connects, and
postulate that lower similarity implies lower edge plausibility.
Graph Recovery: We show the effectiveness of our approach
in differentiating fake edges from original ones without deter-
mining a priori a specific decision threshold on the plausibility
metric. For this case, we adopt the AUC (area under the ROC
curve) value as the evaluation metric. Extensive experiments
performed on three real-life social network datasets show
that our plausibility metric achieves excellent performance
(corresponding to AUC values greater than 0.95) in most of the
cases. Then, observing that the fake and real edges’ empirical
plausibility follow different Gaussian distributions, we rely
on a Gaussian mixture model and maximum a posteriori
probability estimate to automatically determine the threshold
on the edge plausibility values to detect fake edges. Our
experimental results show that this approach achieves strong
performance with F1 scores above 0.8 in multiple cases. After
deleting the fake edges, we are able to recover, to a large
extent, the original graph from the anonymized one.
Privacy Damage: The two anonymization mechanisms we
consider follow different threat models and privacy defini-
tions. To precisely quantify the privacy impact of our graph
recovery, we propose privacy loss measures tailored to each
mechanism we target. As the first anonymization mechanism
assumes the adversary uses the users’ degrees to conduct her
attack, we evaluate the corresponding privacy impact as the
difference between users’ degrees in the original, anonymized,
and recovered graphs. For the differential privacy mechanism,
we measure the magnitude and entropy of noise added to
the statistical measurements of the graph. Our experimental
results show that the privacy provided by both mechanisms
significantly decreases, which demonstrates the vulnerabilities
of existing graph anonymization techniques.
Enhancing Graph Anonymization: In order to improve the
privacy situation, we propose a method that generates plausible
edges while preserving the original privacy guarantees of each
mechanism. We rely on statistical sampling to select potential
fake edges that follow a similar plausibility distribution as
the edges in the original graph. Our experimental results
show that our enhanced anonymization mechanisms are less
prone to graph recovery (AUC dropping by up to 35%)
and preserve higher graph utility compared to the existing
anonymization mechanisms. More importantly, we show that
our enhanced mechanisms reduce the state-of-the-art graph de-
anonymization [32] attack’s performance significantly (up to
30% decrease in the number of de-anonymized users).
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
paper:
• We perform a graph recovery attack on anonymized
social graphs based on graph embedding that captures
the structural proximity between users and thus unveils
fake edges (i.e., relations) between them.
• We show through extensive experimental evaluation
that our graph recovery attack jeopardizes the pri-
vacy guarantees provided in two prominent graph
anonymization mechanisms.
• We propose enhanced versions of these graph
anonymization mechanisms that improve both their




G = (U, E) Social graph
u ∈ U A social network user
{u, u′} ∈ E An edge connecting users u and u′
A Anonymization mechanism
GA Anonymized social graph
κ(u) Friends of user u
f(u) Embedding vector of user u
sA(u, u
′) Plausibility of edge {u, u′} in GA
GR Recovered social graph
D(G) dK-2 series of G
GF Anonymized graph by enhanced mechanism
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the notations, anonymization mechanisms, and threat model
used throughout the paper in Section II. Section III presents
our edge plausibility definition and Section IV evaluates its
effectiveness. The privacy impact of our graph recovery is
studied in Section V. In Section VI, we introduce our enhanced
graph anonymization mechanisms. Section VII discusses the
related work in the field and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the notations, second,
describe the two anonymization mechanisms we study, and
third, present the threat model.
A. Notations
We model a social graph as an undirected graph G =
(U , E), where set U contains the users (nodes) and set E ⊆
{{u, u′}|u, u′ ∈ U ∧ u 6= u′} represents all the edges of the
graph. We define by A the anonymization mechanism which
transforms G to an anonymized graph GA = (U , EA) following
the privacy criteria of A. By this definition, we only consider
graph anonymization mechanisms that do not add new nodes
but only modify edges. This is in line with most of the previous
works [26], [52], [40], [31], [49]. We further use κ(u) to
represent u’s friends in G, i.e., κ(u) = {u′|{u, u′} ∈ E}. Ac-
cordingly, κA(u) represents u’s friends in GA. For presentation
purposes, we summarize the notations introduced here and in
the following sections in Table I.
B. Graph Anonymization Mechanisms
We briefly review the two graph anonymization mecha-
nisms we study. For more details, we refer the readers to
the original papers. Note that, to fully understand these two
mechanisms, we have also inspected the source code of Sec-
Graph [18], a state-of-the-art software system for evaluating
graph anonymization which includes an implementation of
both k-DA and SalaDP.
k-DA [26]: k-DA follows the notion of k-anonymity in
database privacy. The mechanism assumes that the adversary
has prior knowledge of its target users’ degrees in a social
graph, i.e., numbers of friends, and uses this knowledge to
identify the targets from the graph. To mitigate this privacy
risk, k-DA modifies the original social graph, such that in the
resulting anonymized graph, each user shares the same degree
with at least k − 1 other users.
k-DA takes two steps to achieve its goal. First, it utilizes
dynamic programming to construct a k-anonymous degree
sequence. Second, the mechanism adds edges1 to the original
graph in order to realize the k-anonymous degree sequence.
By calculating the differences between the original degree
sequence and the k-anonymous degree sequence, k-DA main-
tains a list that stores the number of edges needed for each
user, namely the user’s residual degree. When adding an edge
for a certain user, k-DA picks the new adjacent user with the
highest residual degree.
SalaDP [40]: SalaDP is one of the first and most widely
known mechanisms applying differential privacy for graph
anonymization. The statistical metric SalaDP concentrates on
is the dK-2 series of a graph G which counts, for each pair
(i, j) of node degrees i and j, the number of edges in G that
connect nodes of these degrees. A formal definition of dK-2
series will be provided in Section V.
SalaDP also takes a two-step approach to anonymize a
graph. First, the mechanism adds Laplace noise to each el-
ement in the original dK-2 series, and obtains a differentially
private dK-2 series. Then, it generates the anonymized graph
following the new dK-2 series. By checking SecGraph’s
source code, we find that SalaDP generates the anonymized
graph by (mainly) adding fake edges to the original graph in
a random manner.2
From the above descriptions, we can see that neither of the
anonymization mechanisms consider friends’ strong structural
proximity when adding fake edges. The main hypothesis we
investigate is that we can effectively differentiate the fake
edges added by such mechanisms from the original edges,
using a suitable measure for edge plausibility. We focus on fake
added edges (and not on deleted edges) since most of the graph
anonymization mechanisms mainly add edges to the original
social graph for preserving better graph utility. It is worth
noting that our approach (Section III) can also help recover
deleted edges on anonymized graphs. However, the underlying
search space is then O(|U|2), which is computationally very
expensive on large graphs. In the future, we plan to tackle
this problem by designing heuristics to efficiently recover the
deleted edges.
C. Threat Model
The adversary’s goal is to detect fake edges in GA, partially
recover the original graph, and eventually carry out privacy
attacks on the recovered graph. To perform graph recovery, we
assume that the adversary only has access to the anonymized
graph GA and is aware of the underlying anonymization
algorithm. This means that the adversary does not need any
information about the original graph G, such as G’s graph
structure or any statistical background knowledge related to
this graph. Figure 2 depicts a schematic overview of the attack.
1In its relaxed version, k-DA also deletes a small fraction of edges, but its
major operation is still adding edges.
2Line 252 of SalaDP.java in src/anonymize/ of SecGraph.
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A  [1.2, 5.7, -3.2, 0.9]

B  [0.8, -3.4, 5.2, 1.3]

C  [0.9, -1.2, 0.2, 4.3]

D  [-3.2, 0.4, 0.7, 1.1]

E  [7.7, 2.4, -0.2, 0.3]





































Fig. 2: A schematic view of our graph recovery attack. Dashed lines in the graph represent fake added edges; sA(A,B) represents
the plausibility of edge {A,B} (Section III); A [1.2, 5.7, -3.2, 0.9] represents an example embedding vector of A (Section III).
Our graph recovery attack could also be carried out by a
service provider (e.g., OSN operator) to check whether there
are potential flaws in its anonymized graph data before release.
III. EDGE PLAUSIBILITY
To verify our hypothesis that an edge is fake if the users it
connects are structurally distant, we first need to quantify two
users’ structural proximity in a social graph. Previous work
on link prediction provides numerous proximity metrics [25],
[6], [2]. However, these metrics are manually designed and
only capture partial information of structural proximity. The
recent advancement of graph embedding provides us with an
alternative approach [35], [45], [14], [4], [16], [38]. In this
context, users in a social network are embedded into a continu-
ous vector space, such that each user’s vector comprehensively
reflects her structural property in the network. Then, for an
edge in the anonymized graph, we can define its two users’
structural proximity as the similarity of their vectors, and use
this similarity as the edge’s plausibility.
In this section, we first recall the methodology of graph
embedding, and then formally define edge plausibility.
A. Graph Embedding
Graph embedding aims to learn a map f from users in GA
to a continuous vector space, i.e.,
f : U → Rd,
where d, as a hyperparameter, is the dimension of each user’s
vector. We adopt the state-of-the-art optimization framework,
namely Skip-gram [29], [30], to learn f ; the corresponding








Here, the conditional probability P (u′|f(u)) is modeled with
a softmax function
P (u′|f(u)) = exp(f(u
′) · f(u))∑
v∈U exp(f(v) · f(u))
,
where f(u′) · f(u) is the dot product of the two vectors, and
ω(u) represents u’s neighborhood in GA. To define ω(u), we
use a random walk approach following previous works [35],
[14]. Concretely, we start a random walk from each user in GA
for a fixed number of times t, referred to as the walk times.
Each random walk takes l steps, referred to as the walk length.
The procedure results in a set of truncated random walk traces,
and each user’s neighborhood includes the users that appear
before and after her3 in all these random walk traces. Similar
to the vector dimension (d), walk length and walk times (l
and t) are also hyperparameters. We will choose their values
experimentally.
Objective function (Equation 1) implies that if two users
share similar neighborhoods in GA, then their learned vectors
will be closer than those with different neighborhoods. This
results in each user’s vector being able to preserve her neigh-
borhood and to eventually reflect her structural property in GA.
To optimize Equation 1, we rely on stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) with negative sampling [30]. We omit the details here
due to space limitation.
B. Quantifying Edge Plausibility
Given the vectors learned from graph embedding, we define
an edge plausibility as the cosine similarity between its two






where || · ||2 denotes the L2-norm. Consequently, if the vectors
of two users have higher (cosine) similarity, then the edge
connecting these users is more plausible. It is worth noting
that as f(u) ∈ Rd, the range of sA(u, u′) lies in [-1, 1] instead
of [0, 1].
IV. GRAPH RECOVERY
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of our
edge plausibility metric on differentiating fake edges from
original ones without determining a decision threshold on
the edge plausibility a priori. Then, we present a method to
automatically decide whether an edge is fake, which allows us



































































(f) SalaDP (ε = 10)
Fig. 3: [Higher is better] AUC scores for detecting fake edges for different datasets, structural proximity, distance metrics, and
anonymity levels (k resp. ε). The embedding approach clearly outperforms all three traditional structural proximity metrics.
Moreover, cosine similarity performs best, only matched by Bray-Curtis distance.
TABLE II: Statistics of the datasets.
Enron NO SNAP
Number of users 36,692 63,731 4,039
Number of edges 183,831 817,090 88,234
Average degree 10.020 25.642 43.691
Average clustering coefficient 0.497 0.221 0.606
Number of triangles 727,044 3,501,542 1,612,010
A. Experimental Setup
Datasets: We utilize three datasets for our experiments.
The first one, referred to as Enron, is a network of Email
communications in the Enron corporation.4 The second dataset
(NO) is collected from Facebook users in the New Orleans area
by Viswanath et al. [47]. The third dataset (SNAP) by McAuley
and Leskovec is obtained through a survey study [27]. Note
that Enron and NO are the two datasets used in the evaluation
of SecGraph as well [18]. Table II presents some basic statistics
of the three datasets.
Baseline Models and Evaluation Metrics: To demonstrate
3We select 10 users before and after the considered user following previous
works [35], [14], [4].
4https://snap.stanford.edu/data/email-Enron.html
the effectiveness of our plausibility metric, which is essen-
tially a structural proximity metric, we compare it with three
classical structural proximity metrics, namely, embeddedness
(number of common friends), Jaccard index, and Adamic-Adar
score [1]. Their formal definition is as the following.









Recall that cosine similarity is adopted for measuring edge
plausibility based on the users’ vectors learned from graph
embedding. We also test two other vector similarity (distance)
metrics, namely the Euclidean distance and the Bray-Curtis
distance, defined as follows:
Euclidean : ||f(u)− f(u′)||2
Bray-Curtis :
∑d
i=1 |f(u)i − f(u′)i|∑d
i=1 |f(u)i + f(u′)i|
Here, f(u)i is the i-th element of vector f(u).
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For evaluation metrics, we first use the AUC, which
measures the area under the ROC curve. The ROC curve
projects the relation between false-positive rate (on the x-
axis) and true-positive rate (on the y-axis) over a series of
thresholds for a given prediction task. A ROC curve closer to
the top-left border of the plot (high true-positive rate for low
false-positive rate), thus a larger AUC value, indicates higher
prediction performance. Morever, there exists a conventional
standard to interpret AUC values:5 AUC = 0.5 is equivalent to
random guessing, whereas an AUC greater than 0.9 implies an
excellent prediction. Many recent works on assessing privacy
risks have adopted AUC as the evaluation metric [4], [37],
[15], [13], [41], [21]. We also make use of the F1 score for
the method that automatically detects fake edges. Due to the
randomness of the anonymization alogrithms, we repeat our
experiments five times and report the average results.
Parameters in Anonymization Mechanisms: We rely on
SecGraph to perform k-DA and SalaDP [18]. Each anonymiza-
tion mechanism has its own privacy parameter. For k-DA, we
need to choose the value k, i.e., the minimal number of users
sharing a certain degree for all possible degrees in GA. Greater
k implies stronger privacy. In our experiments, we choose
k to be 50, 75, and 100, respectively, to explore different
levels of privacy protection [18]. For SalaDP, the privacy
parameter is ε which controls the noise added to the dK-2
series of G: The smaller ε is, the higher its privacy provision is.
Following previous works [40], [18], we experiment with three
different ε values: 10, 50, and 100. As stated before, both k-DA
and SalaDP’s principal operation is adding fake edges to the
original graph. By running the two anonymization mechanisms
on our three datasets, we discover that this is indeed the case.
For instance, SalaDP (ε = 10) adds 120% more edges to the
NO dataset, while only deleting 1.7% of the original edges.
Hyperparameter Setting: There are mainly three hyperpa-
rameters in the graph embedding phase: walk length (l), walk
times (t) and vector dimension (d). For both k-DA and SalaDP,
we choose l = 100 and t = 80. Meanwhile, we set d = 128
for k-DA and d = 512 for SalaDP. These values are selected
through cross validation (see Section IV-C). For reproducibility
purposes, our source code will be made publicly available.
B. Prediction Results
Figure 3 depicts the AUC values of using our edge plau-
sibility metric (Cosine in Figure 3) to differentiate fake edges
from original ones. In most of the cases, we achieve excellent
performance with AUC values above 0.95. In particular, for
the SalaDP-anonymized SNAP dataset (ε = 100), the average
AUC value is 0.971 (see Figure 3d). The only case where our
edge plausibility does not achieve an excellent performance is
when applying SalaDP on the Enron dataset where the AUC
values are between 0.76 and 0.83. However, we emphasize
that for most of the classification tasks, such AUC is already
considered good.
We also notice that our method performs better against
SalaDP on the SNAP dataset than the the other two. One
reason is that SNAP has the highest number of average degrees
(Table II), which implies more diverse dK-2 series. This
5http://gim.unmc.edu/dxtests/roc3.htm
results in SalaDP adding more fake edges on SNAP, which
leads to high performance of fake edge detection. However, we
do not observe a similar trend for k-DA-anonymized datasets.
The AUC values for other vector similarity (distance)
metrics are presented in Figure 3 as well. Cosine similarity
performs slightly better than both Euclidean distance and
Bray-Curtis distance on k-DA-anonymized graphs. On the
other hand, for SalaDP-anonymized graphs, we can observe
that cosine similarity performs better than Euclidean distance
(around 10% performance gain), while the performance of
Bray-Curtis and cosine similarity is still very close. This shows
that cosine similarity (as well as Bray-Curtis distance) is a
suitable choice for our edge plausibility metric.
Figure 3 also shows that our edge plausibility significantly
outperforms the traditional structural proximity metrics. For
instance, on the SalaDP-anonymized NO dataset (ε = 50), our
approach achieves 0.944 AUC while the result for the best
performing structural proximity, i.e., Jaccard index, is around
0.7. It also appears that embeddedness outperforms the other
two metrics on k-DA-anonymized dataset in most of the cases,
while Jaccard index is rather effective for SalaDP.
C. Hyperparameter Sensitivity
We study the influences of the three hyperparameters (l, t
and d) on the prediction performance. Here, l and t are directly
related to the size of the random walk traces, which essentially
decides the amount of data used for learning embedding
vectors. For both anonymization mechanisms, we observe that
increasing l and t improves the AUC values. However, the
increase is smaller when both of these values are above 60.
Therefore, we set l = 100 and t = 80.
Meanwhile, we observe interesting results for the vector
dimension d: different anonymization mechanisms have differ-
ent optimal choices for d (Figure 4 and Figure 5). It appears
that when detecting fake edges on k-DA-anonymized graphs,
d = 128 is a suitable choice for all datasets. On the other
hand, for SalaDP, d = 512 is able to achieve a stronger
prediction. We confirm that the vector dimension is indeed a
subtle parameter, as was observed in other data domains, such
as biomedical data [3] and mobility data [4]. In conclusion, our
default hyperparameter settings are suitable for our prediction
task.
D. Optimizing Fake Edge Detection
Next, we investigate how to concretely determine whether
an edge in an anonymized graph is fake given its plausibility,
such that the adversary can recover the original graph from
the anonymized one.
Figure 1a and Figure 6 depict the histograms of both fake
and original edges’ plausibility in anonymized NO dataset (by
both k-DA and SalaDP). We see that both follow a Gaussian
distribution with different means and standard deviations.
Similar results are observed on Enron and SNAP datasets.
Given that the general population (plausibility of all edges)
consists of a mixture of two subpopulations (plausibility of
fake and original edges) with each one following a Gaussian
distribution, we can fit the general population with a Gaussian
mixture model (GMM). With the fitted GMM, we can obtain
6










































Fig. 4: [Higher is better] Sensitivity of the AUC with respect to the embedding vector dimension for k-DA-anonymized datasets.











































Fig. 5: [Higher is better] Sensitivity of the AUC with respect to the embedding vector dimension for SalaDP-anonymized datasets.
each edge’s posterior of being fake or original given its
plausibility. If the former is higher than the latter, then we
predict the edge to be fake, effectively performing a maximum
a posteriori (MAP) estimate. This means GMM and MAP
estimate provide us with a concrete threshold to determine
whether an edge is fake given the observed data.
Gaussian Mixture Model: To formally define our GMM, we
first introduce two random variables: B and S. B represents
whether an edge is original (B = 0) or fake (B = 1), while S
represents the plausibility of an edge. The probability density
function of our GMM is formally defined as:





The GMM is parametrized by 6 parameters: w0, µ0, σ0, w1, µ1
and σ1. Here, w0 (w1) is the prior probability of an edge being
original (fake), i.e., w0 = P (B = 0) (w1 = P (B = 1)). The
other 4 parameters are related to the two Gaussian distributions
for edge plausibility: N (sA(u, u′)|µi, σi) for i ∈ {0, 1} is the







Parameter Learning: To learn the 6 parameters of the GMM,
we adopt the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm, which
consists of two steps, i.e., the expectation (E) step and the
maximization (M) step. The E-step calculates, for each edge
in GA, its posterior probability of being fake or original given
its plausibility value. The M-step updates all the 6 parameters
based on the probabilities calculated from the E-step following
maximum likelihood estimation. The learning process iterates
over the two steps until convergence. Here, convergence means
that the log-likelihoods of two consecutive iterations differ less
than a given threshold (we set it to 0.001 in our experiments).
In addition, the initial values of the 6 parameters are set
randomly.
Fake Edge Detection: After the GMM has been learned, we
compute for each edge {u, u′} its posterior probabilities of
being original and fake:




wiN (sA(u, u′)|µi, σi)




wiN (sA(u, u′)|µi, σi)
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(a) k-DA (k = 50)



















(b) k-DA (k = 75)




















(c) SalaDP (ε = 100)


















(d) SalaDP (ε = 50)


















(e) SalaDP (ε = 10)
Fig. 6: Plausibility distributions of fake and original edges in the NO dataset anonymized by the two anonymization mechanisms.
The result for k-DA (k = 100) is depicted in Figure 1a.
TABLE III: [Higher is better] F1 scores for detecting fake
edges using GMM and MAP estimate for both k-DA and
SalaDP on three different datasets.
Enron NO SNAP
k-DA (k = 50) 0.792 0.642 0.857
k-DA (k = 75) 0.796 0.710 0.869
k-DA (k = 100) 0.812 0.761 0.881
SalaDP (ε = 100) 0.672 0.712 0.853
SalaDP (ε = 50) 0.750 0.723 0.835
SalaDP (ε = 10) 0.819 0.876 0.802
and pick the one that is maximum (MAP estimate): If P (B =
1|sA(u, u′)) > P (B = 0|sA(u, u′)), we predict {u, u′} to be
fake, and vice versa.
In the end, we delete all the predicted fake edges, and
obtain the recovered graph GR.
Results: We train GMMs under both anonymization mech-
anisms for all the datasets. Table III presents the results. We
first observe that, in most of the cases, our approach achieves a
strong prediction, e.g., for the SalaDP-anonymized NO dataset
(ε = 10), the F1 score is 0.876. For our worst prediction on
SalaDP-anonymized Enron dataset (ε = 100), the F1 score is
still approaching 0.7. Another interesting observation is that
when the privacy level increases, i.e., higher k or lower ε, our
prediction performance increases in most of the cases. This
can be explained by the fact that higher privacy levels lead to
more fake edges being added.
V. PRIVACY LOSS
As fake edges help an anonymized graph GA satisfy certain
privacy guarantees, we expect that, by obtaining the recovered
graph GR from GA, these guarantees will be violated. In this
section, we first define two metrics tailored to each anonymiza-
tion mechanism for quantifying the privacy loss due to our
graph recovery attack. Then, we present the corresponding
evaluation results.
A. Privacy Loss Measurement
k-DA: k-DA assumes that the adversary only has knowledge
of her targets’ degrees and uses this knowledge to re-identify
them. This means that, if the users’ degrees in GR are more
similar to those in G compared to GA, then the adversary is
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more likely to achieve her goal. Therefore, we propose to
compute users’ average degree difference between GA and
G, as well as between GR and G, to measure the privacy
loss caused by our graph recovery. Formally, we define users’






and define users’ average degree difference between G and GR
(∆R) accordingly.
Note that our approach also deletes some original edges
when recovering GR (false positives). Therefore, if the adver-
sary relies on the users’ exact degrees (as assumed in k-DA) to
de-anonymize them, she might fail. However, a sophisticated
adversary can apply extra heuristics, such as tolerating some
degree differences for finding her targets. In this case, ∆R
being smaller than ∆A can still provide the adversary with a
better chance to achieve her goal.
SalaDP: To quantify the privacy loss for SalaDP, we consider
the noise added to the dK-2 series of the original graph G.
Formally, the dK-2 series of G, denoted by D(G), is a set
with each element ri,j(G) in D(G) representing the number
of edges that connect users of degrees i and j in G. Formally,
ri,j(G) is defined as:
ri,j(G) = |{{u, u′}|{u, u′} ∈ E ∧ |κ(u)| = i ∧ |κ(u′)| = j}|.
Accordingly, ri,j(GA) and ri,j(GR) represent the correspond-
ing numbers in GA and GR. Then, we use ζi,j(G,GA) =
ri,j(GA) − ri,j(G) to denote the noise added to ri,j(G) when
transforming G to GA, and ζi,j(G,GR) = ri,j(GR) − ri,j(G)
to represent the (lower) noise caused by our graph recovery
attack. Since SalaDP is a statistical mechanism, we sample
100 anonymized graphs {GtA}100t=1 by applying SalaDP to G
100 times and produce 100 noise samples {ζi,j(G,GtA)}100t=1
for each element in D(G).
We define two metrics for quantifying the privacy loss due
to graph recovery for SalaDP. In the first metric, we compare
the difference of average noise added to D(G) before (by
SalaDP) and after graph recovery. Concretely, for each ri,j(G)
in D(G), we first calculate the average absolute noise added
to ri,j(G), denoted by ζ̄i,j(G,GA), over the 100 SalaDP graph













We analogously compute the average added noise ζR after our
graph recovery attack.
For the second approach, we consider the uncertainty
introduced by the added noise. McGregor et al. explore the
connection between privacy and the uncertainty of the output
produced by differential privacy mechanisms [28]. In general,
higher uncertainty implies stronger privacy. We measure the
uncertainty of noise added by SalaDP through estimating its
TABLE IV: Differences in average degree between the original
graph (G), the k-DA anonymized graph (GA) and our recovered
graph (GR).
Enron NO SNAP
∆R ∆A ∆R ∆A ∆R ∆A
k-DA (k = 50) 0.990 1.222 0.499 0.541 6.589 8.216
k-DA (k = 75) 1.367 1.705 0.752 0.875 8.815 11.755
k-DA (k = 100) 2.019 2.377 1.035 1.231 11.565 16.018
empirical entropy. To this end, we calculate the Shannon en-
tropy over the frequencies of elements in {ζi,j(G,GtA)}100t=1 (the
100 noise samples described above), denoted by Ĥi,j(G,GA).







We compute the average entropy after our graph recovery
similarly and denote it as ĤR.
B. Evaluation
k-DA: Table IV presents the results of the users’ degree
differences. In all cases, ∆R is smaller than ∆A. This indicates
that the adversary has a better chance to identify her targets
from GR than from GA, and demonstrates that our attack
clearly decreases the privacy provided by k-DA. It also appears
that our graph recovery gains least benefits for the adversary on
the NO dataset, where ∆R is closer to ∆A. This is essentially
due to the fact that the original NO dataset already preserves
a high k-degree anonymity.
SalaDP: Table V presents the average noise added to the dK-2
series of the original graph with respect to the anonymized and
recovered graphs. We observe that, in all cases, ζR is smaller
than ζA showing that our recovery attack reduces the average
noise for SalaDP. We also observe that the relative reduction of
the average noise with our graph recovery in general decreases
when increasing ε: The added noise is already much smaller
for larger ε and cannot be further reduced.
Table VI presents the average entropy of the noise added
to the dK-2 series of the original graph after applying SalaDP
and after the graph recovery attack. Note that, while one would
expect higher entropy for smaller values of ε, this does not
hold true in practice because the SalaDP mechanism is not
necessarily optimal with respect to the added uncertainty. Still,
across all values of ε and all the datasets, we can observe a
reduction of the empirical entropy, and therefore a reduction of
the privacy provision. The relative reduction, however, varies
between the values of ε and, as for the average noise above,
between the datasets.
For now, it seems unclear how these various factors impact
the relative reduction of empirical entropy. Analyzing the im-
pact of these parameters on the relative reduction of empirical
entropy could provide further insights into the recoverability
of anonymized graphs. Such work is, however, orthogonal to
the work presented in this paper and could be an interesting
direction for our future work.
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TABLE V: Differences in average noise on the original graph
G’s dK-2 series by SalaDP (ζA) and by our graph recovery
attack (ζR).
Enron NO SNAP
ζR ζA ζR ζA ζR ζA
SalaDP (ε = 100) 4.432 5.282 6.048 6.415 3.422 4.018
SalaDP (ε = 50) 4.224 7.121 7.731 9.471 3.489 4.445
SalaDP (ε = 10) 4.958 12.004 7.982 16.033 3.672 5.690
TABLE VI: Differences in average entropy of the noise on the
original graph G’s dK-2 series by SalaDP (ĤA) and by our
graph recovery attack (ĤR).
Enron NO SNAP
ĤR ĤA ĤR ĤA ĤR ĤA
SalaDP (ε = 100) 0.180 2.029 1.243 2.515 1.999 2.209
SalaDP (ε = 50) 0.556 1.865 1.754 2.852 2.000 2.238
SalaDP (ε = 10) 1.095 1.381 2.275 3.112 1.926 2.022
Note that differential privacy guarantees are theoretically
not violated since differential privacy is, by definition, closed
under post-processing [11]. However, despite these formal
semantic guarantees are still valid, we demonstrate that our
recovery attack can, without additional knowledge about the
data, reduce the magnitude of the actual noise put in place
to perturb the original graph by exploiting the graph structure.
This demonstrates that, by simply looking at the sanitized data,
we can concretely jeopardize the anonymity of the graph.
Graph De-anonymization: We also compare the performance
of the graph de-anonymization attack designed by Narayanan
and Shmatikov [32], referred to as the NS-attack, on both
anonymized and recovered social graphs. Our experiments
show that, contrary to what one might initially expect, graph
recovery does not improve the performance of the graph de-
anonymization significantly. Our explanation is that the NS-
attack assumes a much stronger adversary model, such as an
auxiliary graph with seed nodes already de-anonymized (see
Section VI). Moreover, Ji et al. show that, in many cases, the
NS-attack even performs better on the anonymized graph than
on the original graph [18].
VI. ENHANCING GRAPH ANONYMIZATION
In this section, we take the first step towards enhancing
the existing graph anonymization mechanisms. We start by
presenting our methodology, then evaluate the performance of
fake edge detection as well as graph utility with the enhanced
mechanisms. In the end, we study our new anonymized graphs’
resistance to graph de-anonymization.
A. Methodology
To improve the graph anonymization mechanisms, intu-
itively, we should add fake edges that are more similar to
edges in the original graph G. Figure 7 depicts the edge
plausibility distributions for the original NO dataset under two
different vector dimensions.6 We observe that both empirical
6We map all users in G into vectors and compute all edges’ plausibility in
G following the same procedure as for GA (Section III).




















(a) d = 128

















(b) d = 512
Fig. 7: Edge plausibility in the original NO dataset follows a
Gaussian distribution. We choose two vector dimensions for
edge plausibility: (a) d = 128 and (b) d = 512, following the
evaluation results in Section IV.
distributions follow a Gaussian distribution. If we are able to
modify the current graph anonymization mechanisms such that
the plausibility of the added fake edges is more likely to come
from the same Gaussian distribution, it should be harder to
discover these fake edges.
The general procedure for our enhanced anonymization
mechanisms is as follows. We first apply maximum likelihood
estimation to learn the Gaussian distribution of edge plausibil-
ity in G, denoted by N (s(u, u′)|µ,σ), where s(u, u′) represents
{u, u′}’s plausibility in G. Then, we conduct the same process
as in k-DA and SalaDP. A loop is performed through all the
users and, in each iteration, if a user u needs m fake edges, we
construct a candidate set γ(u) which includes all the potential
users that could share a fake edge with u (following the
original anonymization mechanisms’ design). Different from
the original approaches of k-DA and SalaDP for choosing m
users out of γ(u), we compute the plausibility between users in
γ(u) and u,7 represented as a set λ(u) = {s(u, v)|v ∈ γ(u)}.
Then, for each plausibility s(u, v) in λ(u), we calculate its
density using the previously learned N (s(u, u′)|µ,σ), and treat
the density as the weight of the user v in γ(u). Next, we
perform a weighted sampling to choose m users out of γ(u)
and add edges between these users and u. In the end, we
obtain our new anonymized graph GF under the enhanced
mechanisms.
Note that, as presented in Section II, for a user u, SalaDP
chooses m users from γ(u) in a random manner, while k-DA
picks the users with the highest residual degrees. However, the
reason for k-DA to take this approach is to efficiently construct
the anonymized graph. Through experiments, we discover that
our enhanced k-DA can also build the anonymized graph in a
similar time.
We emphasize that our enhanced mechanisms do not affect
the privacy criteria of k-DA and SalaDP as they do not modify
the privacy realization process of the original mechanisms. We
will make the source code for the aforementioned enhanced
versions of k-DA and SalaDP publicly available.
7The plausibility is computed over users’ vectors learned from G.
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(a) Enhanced k-DA (k = 50)



















(b) Enhanced k-DA (k = 75)

















(c) Enhanced SalaDP (ε = 100)

















(d) Enhanced SalaDP (ε = 50)
















(e) Enhanced SalaDP (ε = 10)
Fig. 8: Plausibility distributions of fake and original edges in the NO dataset anonymized with our enhanced mechanisms. The
result for k-DA (k = 100) is depicted in Figure 1b.
TABLE VII: [Higher is better] AUC scores for detecting fake
edges for both enhanced k-DA and SalaDP on three different
datasets.
Enron NO SNAP
k-DA (k = 50) 0.677 0.628 0.939
k-DA (k = 75) 0.728 0.676 0.927
k-DA (k = 100) 0.753 0.702 0.896
SalaDP (ε = 100) 0.806 0.890 0.719
SalaDP (ε = 50) 0.794 0.895 0.723
SalaDP (ε = 10) 0.724 0.853 0.723
B. Evaluation
Fake Edge Detection: After obtaining GF , we perform the
same process as in Section III to compute the plausibility of all
edges in GF . Then, we calculate the AUC values when using
plausibility to differentiate between fake and original edges in
GF . The results are presented in Table VII.
First of all, the AUC values drop in all cases compared to
the results in Figure 3. Especially for the k-DA-anonymized
NO dataset (k = 50), AUC drops by 35% to 0.628. This can be
TABLE VIII: [Higher is better] F1 scores for detecting fake
edges using GMM and MAP estimate for both enhanced k-DA
and SalaDP on three different datasets.
Enron NO SNAP
k-DA (k = 50) 0.531 0.391 0.632
k-DA (k = 75) 0.428 0.433 0.609
k-DA (k = 100) 0.510 0.501 0.597
SalaDP (ε = 100) 0.422 0.370 0.515
SalaDP (ε = 50) 0.390 0.411 0.522
SalaDP (ε = 10) 0.439 0.527 0.490
also observed from the histograms in Figure 1b and Figure 8:
By plausibility, fake edges are hidden quite well among the
original edges (compared to Figure 1a and Figure 6). When
applying our enhanced k-DA mechanism on SNAP, the AUC
values drop, but less than for NO. This may be due to the
dataset’s small size (4,039 users) and the large k value, which
leads to a large number of fake edges. On the other hand,
the performance decrease for SalaDP-anonymized datasets is
smaller, but still significant.
Moreover, we discover from Figure 1b and Figure 8 that the
11






















Fig. 9: Comparing the utility of our enhanced mechanism
(GF ) to the original mechanism (GA) for different datasets and
metrics. Any point above the diagonal indicates better utility
of our anonymized graph. The x-axis is the cosine similarity
of GA to the original graph G, and the y-axis analogue for GF .
two Gaussian distributions of GF for k-DA and SalaDP largely
overlap (see Figure 1a and Figure 6 for comparison). This
indicates that the Gaussian mixture model approach described
in Section IV cannot perform effective fake edge detection.
For instance, our experiments with the GMM approach only
achieve around 0.37 F1 score for SalaDP (ε = 100) on
the NO dataset, which represents a 50% performance drop
(see Table VIII).
It is worth noting that all the edges added by our en-
hanced anonymization mechanisms still have relatively smaller
plausibility than the original edges. Given that our weighted
sampling follows the original edges’ plausibility distribution in
G, this implies that not many potential fake edges are normal
with respect to plausibility. We conclude that it is non-trivial to
create fake edges totally indistinguishable from original edges.
Graph Utility: The main motivation for OSNs to share their
graph data is to allow third parties to conduct research or build
commercial applications. Therefore, a graph anonymization
mechanism needs to take into account graph utility, i.e., how
well the anonymized graph preserves the structural properties
of the original graph. To show that our enhanced mechanisms
outperform the current anonymization mechanisms, we also
evaluate GF ’s utility.
There exist many graph properties that can be used to
evaluate graph utility [12], [24], [18]. For the sake of concise-
ness, we focus on three of them including degree distribution,
eigencentrality, and triangle count. The degree distribution
represents the proportion of users with a certain degree
for all possible degrees. Eigencentrality evaluates the influ-
ence/importance of each user in a graph. It assigns a centrality
score for each user based on the eigenvector of the graph’s
adjacency matrix. Triangle count summarizes the number of
triangles each user belongs to in a graph which reflects the
graph connectivity [24]. We compute the three properties for
G, GA, and GF , and calculate the cosine similarity between
G’s and GA’s properties as well as between G’s and GF ’s
properties. Higher similarity naturally implies better utility.
Figure 9 presents the results. We first observe a strong
TABLE IX: De-anonymization prevention of our enhanced
mechanism (GF ) and the original mechanism (GA). [Lower
is better] Number of nodes the NS-attack can correctly de-
anonymize. Best scores are in bold.
Enron NO SNAP
GA GF GA GF GA GF
k-DA (k = 50) 307 289 759 532 328 303
k-DA (k = 75) 309 270 689 508 294 234
k-DA (k = 100) 302 256 580 491 274 208
SalaDP (ε = 100) 265 255 470 396 378 342
SalaDP (ε = 50) 243 225 291 277 370 290
SalaDP (ε = 10) 236 207 233 208 376 267
similarity between GF and G for all graph properties, i.e., GF
preserves high utility. For instance, the cosine similarity for
triangle count is above 0.86 in most of the cases. Meanwhile,
the lowest cosine similarity (degree distribution) is still ap-
proaching 0.7 when applying enhanced k-DA (k = 100) to
SNAP.
More importantly, we observe that GF preserves better
graph utility than GA (almost all points in Figure 9 are
above the diagonal). For instance, the eigencentrality’s cosine
similarity between GF and G is 0.985 while the similarity
between GA and G is only 0.836 for the k-DA-anonymized
NO dataset (k = 50). This is because the fake edges added by
our enhanced mechanisms are more structurally similar to the
original edges, thus preserving better utility.
Graph De-anonymization: Next, we investigate the perfor-
mance of graph de-anonymization on graphs generated by our
enhanced mechanisms. We concentrate on the NS-attack [32]
due to its superior performance over others [18]. The NS-
attack assumes that the adversary knows an auxiliary graph
with all nodes’ identities. Her goal is to map each node in the
auxiliary graph to the node representing the same user in an
anonymized target graph. Correctly matched nodes are thus
successfully de-anonymized in the target graph. To ease this
matching, the NS-attack assumes that the adversary has prior
knowledge of some correctly matched nodes, namely the seed
nodes. The attack then starts from these seeds to de-anonymize
more nodes by propagating throughout the whole anonymized
graph.
We use GA and GF as the target graphs, respectively,
and sample a subgraph from the original graph G containing
all edges among 25% randomly selected nodes in G as the
auxiliary graph. Moreover, we choose the 200 nodes with
the highest degrees from the auxiliary graph as our seeds.8
For evaluation, we concentrate on correctly and wrongly de-
anonymized users.
Table IX shows the results. First of all, the number of
correctly de-anonymized nodes by the NS-attack is reduced
in all cases thanks to our enhanced mechanisms. Figure 10
further depicts the anonymity gain, i.e., the performance drop
with respect to the correctly de-anonymized nodes. We see
that the NS-attack de-anonymizes almost 30% fewer nodes on
the enhanced k-DA-anonymized (k=50) NO dataset. We also


























Fig. 10: [Higher is better] Gain in anonymity with respect to
the reduction of the number of correctly de-anonymized nodes
by the NS-attack between using our enhanced mechanism
versus the original mechanism.
notice from Table IX that our enhanced mechanisms reduce the
total number of nodes that the NS-attack de-anonymizes (both
correct and wrong ones). This indicates that the NS-attack’s
ability to propagate also degrades in graphs anonymized by
our enhanced mechanisms.
VII. RELATED WORK
Various graph anonymization mechanisms have been pro-
posed in the literature [26], [52], [17], [8], [53], [46], [9], [36],
[48], [49], [31]. One class of these mechanisms follows the
concept of k-anonymity. Liu and Terzi [26] propose the first
approach in this direction, i.e., k-DA, which we concentrate
on in this paper. Meanwhile, Zhou and Pei [52] propose k-
neighborhood anonymity, where each user in the anonymized
graph shares the same neighborhood, i.e., the sub-social net-
work among her friends, with at least k − 1 other users.
The authors adopt minimum BFS coding to represent each
user’s neighborhood, then rely on a greedy match to realize
k-neighborhood anonymity.
Another class of graph anonymization mechanisms is in-
spired by differential privacy. Besides SalaDP, multiple solu-
tions have been proposed [36], [48], [49]. For instance, Wang
and Wu [48] present a 2K-graph generation model to achieve
differential privacy, where noise is added based on smooth sen-
sitivity. Xiao et al. [49] encode users’ connection probabilities
with a hierarchical random graph model, and perform Markov
chain Monte Carlo to sample a possible graph structure from
the model while enforcing differential privacy. Besides the
above, other graph anonymization techniques include [17], [8],
[31].
Due to space constraints, we only consider the two most
widely known anonymization mechanisms, i.e., k-DA and
SalaDP. In the future, we plan to apply our approach to more
anonymization mechanisms.
Besides anonymization, graph de-anonymization has been
extensively studied as well. Backstrom et al. are among the
first to de-anonymize users in a naively anonymized social
graph [5]. The attack of Narayanan and Shmatikov is essen-
tially a framework [32], based on which multiple approaches
have been proposed [43], [19], [33], [42]. We emphasize that
graph de-anonymization is orthogonal to our graph recovery
attack. First of all, graph de-anonymization attacks aim to
identify users in an anonymized graph while our graph re-
covery aims to find fake added edges. As shown in Section V,
our graph recovery can degrade anonymized graphs’ privacy
guarantees. The reason our graph recovery cannot increase the
performance of graph de-anonymization (in our case, of the
NS-attack), is that most of the graph de-anonymization attacks
assume a much stronger attack model than those considered
in graph anonymization mechanisms. Therefore, we propose
privacy loss metrics tailored to k-DA and SalaDP, which we
believe are more appropriate. Moreover, we show that our
enhanced anonymization mechanisms that are inspired by our
graph recovery attack significantly reduce the success rate of
graph de-anonymization.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identify a fundamental vulnerability of
the existing graph anonymization mechanisms which do not
take into account key structural characteristics of a social
graph when adding fake edges to it. We propose an edge
plausibility metric based on graph embedding that enables us to
exploit this weakness in order to identify fake edges. Extensive
experiments show that, using this metric, we are able to
recover the original graph from an anonymized graph to a large
extent. Our graph recovery also results in significant privacy
damage to the original anonymization mechanisms. To mitigate
this weakness, we propose enhancement over the existing
anonymization mechanisms. Our experiments show that our
enhanced mechanisms significantly reduce the performance of
our graph recovery attack, increase graph de-anonymization
resistance, and at the same time provide better graph utility.
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